It‘s four Minutes from New Delhi to Islamabad

Guest article by Syeda Saba Batool and Abdul Moiz Khan

The Netflix hit “A House of Dynamite” paints a nuclear nightmare on the premise the United States has 20 minutes to decide upon retaliation against an unknown attacker far to its east – a decision threatening nuclear Armageddon. The time upon which Islamabad and New Delhi would have to respond is a mere four minutes.

“A House of Dynamite” is not just another thriller, but a chilling reflection of the dangerous gap in today’s deterrence scenario, offering  a bleak outlook on global deterrence that makes the case for urgent risk-reduction measures before fiction turns into reality.

The film’s 20-minute countdown to a possible preemptive strike mirrors the real-world fragility of contemporary deterrence thinking, decision making and crisis communication among nuclear powers. In an era where Russia is testing the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater nuclear-capable torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, and with U.S. President Donald Trump calling for the resumption of nuclear testing, the line between miscalculation and catastrophe is thinner than ever.

 “A House of Dynamite” might have some technical flaws, but it exposes the increasing dangers of a nuclear crisis. When a state detects a long range missile heading towards its territory, there is no way to ascertain whether it is carrying a nuclear warhead or not. This uncertainty can lead to inadvertent escalation and potentially a nuclear crisis, as the other state may see no option but to launch a preemptive strike because of the use-it or lose-it dilemma. It is a chilling reminder of the dangers in the narrower gap in the Islamabad/New Delhi  deterrence scenario

When the fictitious Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA) in the movie asks the Russian Foreign Minister if he would be able to communicate the location of their submarine, the minister hesitates to disclose its ocation, not trusting America for the security of the submarine. Moreover, when the Deputy NSA asks the minister to trust the U.S. in a case of warheads flying over the Russian air space, the minister says with candor; “Trust? Why?” The movie thus portrays the lack of trust between states even in normal  timesshoulda crisis situation arises. Although the situation portrayed in the movie is fictitious, it highlights the need for renewed trust-building measures between nuclear weapon states.

Furthermore, in the movie, it is shown that the U.S. had only twenty minutes to decide whether to respond preemptively to a potential nuclear strike or not. These twenty minutes are portrayed as insufficient time for communication among states such as North Korea, Russia, China, and the U.S. to determine whether the missile launch was accidental or intentional, or carried a nuclear warhead.

Crisis communication with trust building is one factor capable of de-escalating a nuclear crisis.  The movie shows that if state A is not informed about an accidental launch of a missile by state B, it cannot assume that the missile is not carrying a nuclear warhead. In such a situation, state A has only a few minutes to decide on its retaliatory options including a preemptive strike. Also, if both states are already in a crisis situation, state A may assume that the coming missile or barrage of missiles from state B is a pre-emptive nuclear strike, triggering a definitive inadvertent escalation.

Moreover, if early warning radars fail to detect the missile launch or accurately track its flight path it becomes difficult to determine its intended target until it reaches its terminal phase. This leaves very little time to evacuate millions of people from potential impact zones. Such scenarios expose the vulnerabilities in contemporary deterrence thinking. In the movie, the U.S. has been shown unable to determine the launch location of the missile despite having one of the most advanced early warning systems in the world. Now, if one looks at a crisis situation, in a region like South Asia the probability of early detection is even more difficult.

While the film dramatizes this dilemma in the U.S. context, South Asia has already faced similar near-crisis realities. While the U.S. had 20 minutes as shown in the movie, Pakistan reportedly had only 3–4 minutes when India launched its BrahMos missiles during the May 2025 conflict. According to available data, BrahMos is a dual-use system, and when a missile was projected to hit Rawalpindi, housing Pakistan’s military command center, it could have been misperceived as a nuclear tipped missile, a potential counter-command attack, prompting Islamabad to launch a preemptive strike leading to a nuclear war.

In yet another event on 9 March 2022, India reportedly accidentally fired a BrahMos missile from Ambala, which crashed into the Pakistani town of Mian Channu. This accident was also highly dangerous given  that the BrahMos could have been carrying a nuclear wearhead. India also did not inform Pakistan of the accidental launch or that the missile was not carrying a warhead. New Delhi only admitted the accidental missile launch one day after the impact. This lack of communication in an already fragile environment could again have led to a serious crisis if the missile was projected to hit any sensitive sites.

Mounting nuclear threats and increasing risks of a nuclear crisis require renewed efforts to undertake risk-reduction measures by nuclear-weapon states. The world has witnessed only one instance where one nuclear state dropped nuclear bombs on a non-nuclear state (Japan) and the impact of that attack is still enduring. The world is yet to witness a nuclear war between two nuclear states with second-strike capability, and in a case like the one shown in the movie, the war may involve more than two nuclear states. The catastrophic impact of such a nuclear war cannot be pre-calculated, and with advancements in high-impact systems, the climatic impact might affect the entire globe.

The movie has an enigmatic ending as the President of the U.S.  has only a few seconds to decide whether to launch a preemptive strike from the range of options at his disposal. It is not shown which one the President choose,s symbolizing that no one in the world is really ready for a nuclear war. Deciding on  an option for responding  to a presumed nuclear attack could  ultimately lead to Mutually Assured Destruction. It is pertinent for all the nuclear weapon states to engage in risk reduction measures, either at bilateral level, in the case of India-Pakistan or U.S.-Russia, or a multilateral level, in the case of other countries. Moreover, it is especially pertinent for the U.S. and Russia to renew existing arms control agreement and sign new ones, as they are responsible for about 87 per cent of the world’s nuclear stockpiles.

In short, nuclear weapon states need to review their deterrence thinking, address the contemporary challenges to work towards institutionalized crisis management, and obviate the political, economic, and climatic impacts of a potential nuclear war.

---

Disclaimer: The time frame of twenty minutes can even decrease based on the launch position of the warhead and capability of early warning systems to detect them. Just for a general understanding, a twenty minute time frame was given in the movie which was kept as a reference point.

---

Syeda Saba Batool is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) in Islamabad and serves as a board member of the Emerging Voices Network (EVN-Nuclear). She is also a recognized woman expert with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN). An alumna of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Vienna, she holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. As an emerging expert on peaceful nuclear applications, nuclear safety, security, and energy security, she has contributed to leading platforms such as the South Asian Voices, the loop ECPR, London School of Economics – LSE Blogs, 9DashLine, Inkstick Media, the Atomic Reporters, Pakistan Horizon, British Pugwash, Wavell Room, and BASIC.
Connect with her at sababatool72@gmail.com or at +923326407407 and on X (formerly Twitter) @TheSabaShahh.

Abdul Moiz Khan is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. He is also a visiting faculty member at the School of Politics and IR at Quaid- e-Azam University, Islamabad.
His works are widely published on different platforms like Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, BASIC, Stimson Center, the Diplomat, and South China Morning Post among others. His area of interest are non-nuclear strategic weapons, third nuclear age, strategic stability in South Asia, and Nuclear Seccurity in Pakistan.
He is also the youngest Pakistani to present his research on nuclear energy at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Connect with him at kmoiz768@gmail.com and X (formerly Twitter) @kmoizsays.