Guest article by Syeda Saba Batool and Sana Ahmed | 1 July 2026

Armed strikes against Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Iran’s Busher NPP and other nuclear facilities, have raised alarm and asserted the need for international law prohibiting them.

The following analysis considers possible consequences of an attack on Israel’s Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Centre and its heavy water reactor. The nearby city of Dimona, the unofficial name given to its reactor and facilities, was targeted in current hostilities in the Middle East in March 2026.

The Dimona Centre is located in and surrounded by the Negev Desert, about 56 kilometers from Jerusalem and 13 kilometers south east of Dimona city. Its reactor produces plutonium supported by extraction facilities and other weapons related activities.

In the event of an attack, immense amounts of radioactive material with short term and long-term transboundary effects would be released. The location of the reactor would allow dry deposition, atmospheric dispersion and long-term homogenization of radioactive particles, increasing persistent radiological contamination beyond the initial phase of release. Consequently, the impacts are likely to be both short and long term, encompassing immediate inhalation risks as well as persistent land contamination, agricultural losses, and long-term radiation exposure.

Unlike a typical civilian nuclear power plant Dimona includes not only a reactor but also reprocessing facilities, waste storage and weapons production. Although its reactor is smaller than commercial reactors such as Bushehr-1, decades of operation since the 1950s have led to the accumulation of radioactive materials, spent fuel, and waste.

The centre is also believed to contain separated plutonium and high-level radioactive waste, which are generally not present at civilian reactors. In commercial plants, spent fuel remains contained within secure storage systems and is not chemically reprocessed on-site. As a result, an attack on Dimona could release a wider range of radioactive materials and potentially cause more complex and long-lasting environmental and health consequences than an attack on a conventional civilian reactor.

Dimona is the keystone of Israel’s nuclear programme. new construction and expansion of the facility have been reported over the years as Israel upgrades plutonium production at the site.  Satellite images show probable waste burial sites and new underground construction, including, presumably, a new heavy-water reactor to grow Israel’s nuclear weapons programme.

The seismic risk profile of the Dimona reactor is very complex. In case of a distant strike more than 10 km away, the seismic shock risk will be low, the structural failure risk may be very low and there will be near to no radiological risk. If it is a near miss near 1-5km far, the radiological risk will be low to moderate, but the seismic shock risk and structural failure risk will be moderate. In case of a close strike around less than 1 km away, the structural failure risk and the seismic shock risk will be high, while the radiological risk can be moderate to high. If a direct ballistic missile hit the reactor, the seismic shock risk and structural risk will be very high, but the radiological risk may be high. If a hypersonic missile hits the area, the radiological risk will be very high, the seismic shock risk and the structural failure risk will be extreme.

Beyond causing physical harm, such an attack would have major strategic ramifications, undermining the established norm against attacking nuclear infrastructure, making future attacks more likely, and increasing the possibility that a conventional military strike will escalate into a regional radiological crisis. A potential attack on Dimona would therefore represent more than an environmental or humanitarian crisis, it could also reshape regional deterrence calculations, influence crisis signalling, and undermine broader stability across the Middle East.

In an attack there are three primary release scenarios. The first would be an attack on the reactor core leading to the release of volatile fission products including caesium-137 and iodine-131. The second case would be of an attack on the Machon 2, reprocessing infrastructure and the possible dispersion of chemically separated plutonium and highly radiotoxic isotopes. The third case would be an attack on the radioactive waste storage and Machon 4, treatment facilities, releasing accumulated high-level waste such as strontium-90 and caesium-137.

An attack on Machon 2, the reprocessing facility where chemically separated plutonium and long-lived isotopes are stored, could form localized “hot spots” that pose severe long-term health and environmental risks releasing high-level waste residues and alpha-emitting plutonium isotopes (Pu-239/240). With immediate geographic effects concentrated around Dimona and possible transboundary fallout contingent on atmospheric balance, and weather conditions, such a scenario could resemble a mechanical-dispersion event. The contamination may become chronic even if the plume footprint is geographically limited.

Around Dimona, Israel has constructed a multi-layered missile defence system that includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2, Arrow 3, and THAAD. However, given interceptor limitations, logistical strain, and the difficulties of AI-based decision-making, it can still be overpowered by saturation attacks and protracted high-intensity conflict.

Even though the Dimona reactor is situated in a far-off desert, a plutonium or tritium leak could still seriously contaminate the surrounding area. Radioactive material could be dispersed over a larger area and possibly into Jordan and Palestinian territories due to weather and desert dust. As a result, a local incident would become a regional environmental and humanitarian crisis. Additionally, it would raise the possibility of escalation near nuclear sites and erode arms control standards.

---

About the authors

Syeda Saba Batool is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) in Islamabad and an IAEA Marie Curie Fellow. She has presented her work on different international platforms, including the AMC Conference at Uppsala University. An alumna of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Vienna, she holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. As an emerging expert on peaceful nuclear applications, nuclear safety, security, and energy security, she has contributed to leading platforms such as the South Asian Voices, the loop ECPR, London School of Economics – LSE Blogs, 9DashLine, Inkstick Media, Atomic Reporters, Pakistan Horizon, British Pugwash, Wavell Room, and BASIC. Available at sababatool72@gmail.com, +923326407407, or on X under the handle @TheSabaShahh

---

This article is an abridged version of the SVI Monograph of May 2026. Find the longer assessment published as SVI Monograph available at:  https://thesvi.org/svi-monograph SVI Monograph: May 2026