Guest article by former IAEA inspector Bob Kelley
On September 6, 2007, the Israel air force operating in secrecy bombed a target at Al Kibar in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor on the banks of the Euphrates River in Eastern Syria and claimed it was part of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Despite an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection in 2008 uncertainty about the facility on the Al Kibar site persists. Since the ouster of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in March 2025 the new administration in Syria has increased cooperation with international organizations such as the IAEA whose inspectors are being offered access to former nuclear sites in Syria. Veteran former IAEA inspector Bob Kelley considers the invitation and offers guidelines and recommendations for the IAEA inspection based on his own involvement in successful inspections and analytical findings in Iraq (after 1991) and Libya (2004), both of which had been operating secret nuclear weapons programmes.
IAEA Seeks a “Swift” Syrian Resolution, but the Safeguards List to Damascus is Long
The press reports that Syria is offering the IAEA a visit to the Al Kibar site.1 There was a building at this site that was bombed by Israel in 2007. The justification for the bombing was that it was a nuclear reactor modelled on a North Korean MAGNOX-type reactor, i.e., natural uranium fuel, graphite moderated and CO2 cooled. The IAEA only had one visit to the site in 2008 with just two inspectors and a few hours. This is a new chance to take a longer and better look.
The purpose of the visit is to:
- Establish the actual original purpose of the site
- Collect supporting documents and interviews
- Collect physical samples of materials such as uranium, graphite and barite
- Visit and establish any facilities in Syria allegedly connected to the site
- Verify foreign assistance in design and construction
Establish the original purpose of the site
Any inspection of the Al Kibar reactor will begin in the offices of the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS).
Interview any personnel who were involved in the original purpose of the site. Establish their bona fides regarding their past participation. Review and copy documents, especially engineering drawings of the site as built. Establish a timeline of key dates such as first conception, then funding and key dates in construction.
Establish the extent of ties to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) if any. Much of the previous discussion of the site is based upon allegations that DPRK engineers participated in the construction of the site and that it was modelled on a graphite moderated natural uranium reactor in DPRK.
If the site is confirmed as a reactor:
Establish the source of the reactor design.
Identify the source of uranium fuel for the reactor (Syria or external).
Determine the amount of uranium fuel present at the time of the bombing and establish safeguards accounting for the original amount and any uranium recovered after the bombing.
AECS shall make a declaration of the uranium inventory and sites for safeguards purposes. Provide a Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the reactor and any other undeclared nuclear facilities.
The Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, MNSR, is well-known, already declared and unrelated to al Kibar.
Identify the planned disposition of irradiated fuel, such as spent fuel storage and reprocessing, plutonium extraction, high level waste disposal etc.
Physical locations for inspection
Design authority for Syria, presumably the Atomic Energy Commission in Damascus but possibly elsewhere.
The site of the building bombed in 2007. It was razed around 2008. A new building was built on the exact site and that building has been largely destroyed by the civil war. Establish if there is any connection between the original building and the second one built after the bombing. (This is a very low priority.)
Inspect the ruins of the “office building” located approximately 150 meters north of the destroyed building. This is where uranium particles were reported in 2008.
Inspect any surviving infrastructure such as pumps and storage tanks for process water.
Document electrical supply to the site. Document any evidence of mining at the site of the bombed building, especially 150 meters to the east.
Inspect the riverside pump house approximately 800 meters west of the reactor. Establish the security of the site, electrical supply, emergency power supply and size of pumps. Identify the hot water discharge (if any) and supply pipelines from the Euphrates River.
Visit the water treatment plant located 5 km east of the bombed site. This site appears to be connected by a well-graded road, electrical lines and water lines to the bombed building. Establish the connection to the bombed site. The water treatment plant was built several years before the bombed site. In 2004 it appears complete in satellite imagery and there is mature landscaping such as trees. The bombed building is not as complete in 2004.
Inspect the well-secured riverside pumphouse at Zalabiye 4.2 km south of the bombed building. It supplies water to the water treatment plant that in-turn supports the bombed building. Establish its purpose and who is responsible for it.
Visit the rail loading yard at Zalabiye that appears to be loading black, mined material (anthracite coal?) into rail cars. Investigate any connection to the bombed site. Document the traffic patterns on the roads linking the rail loading site, the bombed building and the water treatment plant. Why are the three sites connected.
Inspect the Tibni Salt Mine 17 km south of the bombed building. The Tibni Salt mine is associated with the storage of radioactive waste.2 The proximity of the proposed radioactive disposal site to the bombed building and association with IAEA make it an obvious choice for inspection and sampling to see if debris contaminated with uranium from the bombed building was, in fact, hidden there. The Tibni mine is supplied with water from the Euphrates River from a pump house complex virtually identical to the one supporting the bombed complex. Is there an administrative connection between the two, possibly through the General Company for Phosphate and Mines (GECOPHAM). This company has ties to the Tibni Salt Mine, the Homs Superphosphate Plant and possibly the rail loading facility at Zalabiye and water treatment facilities.
Visit to the Marj al Sultan facility in the Damascus suburbs (latitude 33.4953, longitude 36.4410). This site has been publicly identified as a uranium processing facility that would be associated with the bombed building at Al Kibar.
Environmental Sampling
Samples should be taken in accordance with approved IAEA sampling protocols. Two inspectors should always be employed. Sterile sampling kits should be used in all cases to avoid cross-contamination. Sampling should be done in the presence of the host county escorts to avoid issues that can arise later.
The three most important sample taking tasks will likely be searching for man-modified uranium of any isotopic composition; graphite particles and anthracite coal as detected in 2008; concrete doped with barite. Barite can be added to concrete to increase the radiation absorption. It was mentioned in early IAEA reports as a signature of a reactor but made no connection to Al Kibar and none was discovered in samples taken there. It is an outlier in IAEA analysis.
One of the conundrums from 2008 sampling was that black particles of anthracite coal were ubiquitous in soil samples. However they were incorrectly reported as graphite (not even reactor grade graphite.) This discrepancy must be resolved. If there is no graphite, only plentiful anthracite coal, earlier conclusions need to be revisited.
Background samples at a short distance from the bombed area are scientifically required to rule out contamination from other sources, such as fallout from historical nuclear weapons testing.
Do not collect soil samples to look for uranium. This has been shown to be costly and ineffective. Swipe samples should be taken from solid objects, preferably protected from weather such as in the ruined office building where uranium was detected in 2008. The other best samples will come from protected structures such as the Tibni mine where debris may have been stored; and from the Marj al Sultan facility which has been badly damaged by war but is still standing.
The final report should not jump to conclusions about isotopic composition of any man-modified uranium that may be found. In earlier summaries, the IAEA concluded that the uranium found was natural and therefore typical of Magnox reactor fuel. It incorrectly excluded other sources such penetrating uranium munitions. The IAEA incorrectly concluded that uranium metal penetrators must be made from depleted uranium. This is patently false and simply reflects US practice. Natural uranium penetrators will have exactly the same military effectiveness as depleted ones and should not be eliminated from consideration.
Composition of Inspection Team
The visit should begin at the AECS and involve access to all of the documentation of the reactor construction. This should be led by a nuclear engineer with knowledge of small reactor design, in particular the MAGNOX. For field visits there is nothing left of the reactor and other supporting facilities. The team visiting the damaged sites should have a strong civil engineering, industrial electrical engineering and geospatial experience. Remains of sites will be exploited through utility supplies and logistical connections such as the three pumping plants. Pictures taken by the IAEA in June 2025 seem to show the remains of Marj al Sultan and suggest the site has been completely gutted. The Tibni Salt mine is an important possible location for waste storge given its past association with the IAEA and the need for quick concealment in 2007/8 for possible uranium contaminated equipment. The inspectors chosen need training in IAEA sampling procedures. They need more training to be situationally aware of the site and its connections. Past inspection experience in Iraq and North Korea indicate that the breadth of this kind of an inspection team is more important than depth in one area such as reactor design. It is important to be able to say what something is even if it is not nuclear-related.
Conclusion
The IAEA was only allowed one inspection in 2008. It was rushed through in only a few hours. There was minimal collection of samples, the results were reported incorrectly and there was no analysis of the bombed building and how it fit into the geography of Al Kibar. Tibni was an obvious site to visit and the IAEA had a valid reason to go there, yet it was neglected.
It now appears that Syria is willing to cooperate and hopefully allow the IAEA to investigate all the connections. If it is a reactor then it will be important to understand the connections to DPRK, the supply of fuel, plutonium recovery and the overall purpose of the reactor project. Was it to create a Syrian nuclear weapons program or assist DPRK or maybe a third party yet undiscovered?
If it is not a reactor there are a lot of lessons to review and learn.
- IAEA Gains Access to Former Syrian Nuclear Sites, www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-07/news/iaea-gains-access-former-syrian-nuclear-sites. ↩︎
- Syria is in the process of constructing a radioactive waste processing facility, to manage the waste resulting from theproduction and application of radioisotopes. AECS has established a separate Radioactive Waste Management Division to oversee the collection, treatment and storage of radioactive waste. Mohammad Ghafar, “Radioactive waste management facility in Syria”, International Conference on Management of Radioactive Waste from Non-Power Applications, IAEA, Report No. IAEA-CN-87/79, 1 July 2001, via ETDEWEB, www.etde.org.
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