

<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/bedd428e26924eed95c5ceaec72d3a4/text-draft-agreement-between-iaea-iran>

Text of draft agreement between IAEA, Iran

Aug. 20, 2015 4:35 PM EDT

VIENNA (AP) — Following is a transcript of the original draft agreement between the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran covering inspections at the Parchin military site, where Iran has been accused of pursuing nuclear weapons development a decade ago. This agreement is separate from the much broader Iran nuclear deal signed by Iran, the U.S. and five other world powers in July. Two officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed to The Associated Press that this draft does not differ from the final, confidential agreement between the IAEA and Iran. The AP was not allowed to have a copy of the draft but was allowed to transcribe the entire text, and it appears here:

Separate arrangement II agreed by the Islamic State of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency on 11 July 2015, regarding the Road-map, Paragraph 5

Iran and the Agency agreed on the following sequential arrangement with regard to the Parchin issue:

1. Iran will provide to the Agency photos of the locations, including those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
2. Iran will provide to the Agency videos of the locations, including those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
3. Iran will provide to the Agency 7 environmental samples taken from points inside one building already identified by the Agency and agreed by Iran, and 2 points outside of the Parchin complex which would be agreed between Iran and the Agency.
4. The Agency will ensure the technical authenticity of the activities referred to in paragraphs 1-3 above. Activities will be carried out using Iran's authenticated equipment, consistent with technical specifications provided by the Agency, and the Agency's containers and seals.
5. The above mentioned measures would be followed, as a courtesy by Iran, by a public visit of the Director General, as a dignitary guest of the Government of Iran, accompanied by his deputy for safeguards.
6. Iran and the Agency will organize a one-day technical roundtable on issues relevant to Parchin.

For the International Atomic Energy Agency: Tero Varjoranta, Deputy Director General for Safeguards

Comment [TR1]: Iran never calls itself "Islamic State"

Comment [TR2]: Normal practice for the IAEA in official documents, legal agreements, is to refer first to the IAEA and then (second) to the Contracting Party – i.e., the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Comment [TR3]: Iran refers to itself as the Islamic Republic of Iran in official documents, not just "Iran"

Comment [TR4]: Standard IAEA swipe kit contains 6 "swipes" (swipe cloths). Even if 7 sampling points or locations within the building (purported 'explosives chamber') are meant, this is an arbitrary number?

Comment [TR5]: Swipes "outside" of Parchin make little sense – and only 2! Even if 2 sampling points or locations outside the Parchin military-industrial facility are meant, this is an arbitrary number?

Comment [TR6]: Not specified how IAEA would "ensure technical authenticity"

Comment [TR7]: This is not standard IAEA language – there is no "authenticated equipment" for the use of States relevant for safeguards, monitoring and verification

Comment [TR8]: This is not standard IAEA language – IAEA safeguards equipment is certified by IAEA for quality/tech specs for IAEA's own use – any technical specifications are not shared with States. Even if IAEA swipe kits are meant, the formulation of language is strange and not standard IAEA language.

Comment [TR9]: Environmental sampling does not involve "containers and seals" as such – swipes are sealed in clear plastic pouches/bags – see photos on my article on www.atomicreporters.com. Again the language is not standard IAEA language.

Comment [TR10]: This is not standard IAEA language – there is no logical rationale for inclusion of such a paragraph. There is no reason for the IAEA Director General to make a "public visit" to Iran – he is not a tourist to make public visit, his visits normally are for official/technical purposes.

Comment [TR11]: IAEA organizes technical meetings, topical meetings, dialogue forums, topical meetings, experts meetings, symposia -- "technical roundtable" is not standard IAEA language

Comment [TR12]: Correct formal title is: Deputy Director General, Head of the Department of Safeguards – this ...

For the Islamic Republic of Iran: Ali Hoseini Tash, Deputy Secretary of Supreme National Security Council for Strategic Affairs

COMMENT:

In my personal view this is *not an authentic document*, several reasons cited in the notes appended in the margin, and the document is not in the standard legal language used by the IAEA in preparing official documents and agreements with States. Likely a crude attempt to hinder the JCPOA and Roadmap – origin of the document could be similar to that of the “Niger Letter” re uranium purchases by Iraq.

Tariq Rauf, former Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, IAEA; Director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Rauf@sipri.org.

See: www.atomicreporters.com for item on environmental sampling, including photos and links to IAEA videos on sampling; and <http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/nuclear/explosive-chambers> for information of the alleged “explosives chamber” at Parchin.

Stockholm: 20 August 2015. 23:34 CEST

Comment [TR13]: This is unprecedented – in the past IAEA has signed agreements with the President or Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and with the senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – these are “designated points of contact” (POC) in Iran for the IAEA – the Supreme National Security Council is not a designated POC and it is highly unlikely that IAEA would sign a binding agreement with such a non-designated entity. Mr Ali Hosseini Tash is previously associated with the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) – Internet search does not bring up Tash as Deputy Secretary of the SNSC – in fact Wikipedia page does not list any position as Deputy Secretary nor Tash.