Irradiated Dimes Article on the production of radionuclides in the 1950s at the Oak Ridge Graphite Reactor and how they revolutionised the field of medicine and many branches of science.
Phosphate Fertilizers As A Proliferation-Relevant Source Of Uranium A historical and often overlooked source of uranium for weapons and nuclear power is the extraction of uranium from phosphate fertilizers. In this way, uranium can be acquired legally but in an undeclared fashion, invisible to international commerce and export controls.
Lifton, Robert J., and Greg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America. HarperCollins, 1996 A half century after the bombing of Hiroshima, two distinguished writers look at the impact of the use of the A-bomb, and the suppression of debate, on American life. Lifton and Mitchell question why Hiroshima still touches such a raw nerve, and explore the distortion and suppression of information about the use of the bomb.
Sagan, Scott Douglas. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton University Press, 1995 Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the ""apparently""excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening ""close calls"" to disaster.
Abraham, Itty. The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State. Zed Books, 1998 In 1974 India exploded an atomic device. In May 1998 the new BJP Government exploded several more, encountering in the process domestic plaudits but international condemnation and a nuclear arms race in South Asia. This book is the first serious historical account of the development of nuclear power in India and of how the bomb came to be made. The author questions orthodox interpretations implying that it was a product of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Instead, he suggests that the explosions had nothing to do with national security as conventionally understood.
Cohen, Avner. Israel and the Bomb. Columbia University Press, 1998 Until now, there has been no detailed account of Israel's nuclear history. Previous treatments of the subject relied heavily on rumors, leaks, and journalistic speculations. But with Israel and the Bomb, Cohen has forged an interpretive political history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government documents - most of them recently declassified and never before cited - and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals who played important roles in this story. Cohen reveals that Israel crossed the nuclear weapons threshold on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, yet it remains ambiguous about its nuclear capability to this day. What made this posture of "opacity" possible, and how did it evolve?
Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956. Yale University Press, 1996 In engrossing detail, David Holloway tells us how Stalin launched a crash atomic program only after the Americans bombed Hiroshima and showed that the bomb could be built; how the information handed over to the Soviets by Klaus Fuchs helped in the creation of their bomb; how the scientific intelligentsia, which included such men as Andrei Sakharov, interacted with the police apparatus headed by the suspicious and menacing Lavrentii Beria; what steps Stalin took to counter U.S. atomic diplomacy; how the nuclear project saved Soviet physics and enabled it to survive as an island of intellectual autonomy in a totalitarian society; and what happened when, after Stalin's death, Soviet scientists argued that a nuclear war might extinguish all life on earth.
Gusterson, Hugh. Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination. Cultural Anthropology 14, no. 1 (2008): 111–143 There is a common perception in the West that nuclear weapons are most dangerous when they are in the hands of Third World leaders. I first became interested in this perception while interviewing nuclear weapons designers for an ethnographic study of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) — one of three laboratories where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed (Gusterson 1996). I made a point of asking each scientist if he or she thought nuclear weapons would be used in my lifetime. Almost all said that they thought it unlikely that the United States or the Russians would initiate the use of nuclear weapons, but most thought that nuclear weapons would probably be used — by a Third World country.
Abraham, Itty. The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories. Osiris 21 (2006): 49–65 This piece argues that a discourse of “control,” authored by the overlapping narratives of academic proliferation studies and U.S. anti-proliferation policy, has come to dominate our understanding of nuclear histories. This discourse, with its primary purpose of seeking to predict which countries are likely to build nuclear weapons and thereby to threaten the prevailing military-strategic status quo, has narrowed the gaze of nuclear historians.
16 March 1946, The Acheson-Lillienthal Report The Acheson-Lilienthal Report was an important United States document of the early Cold War era, as it discussed possible methods for the international control of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of future nuclear warfare.
Proposals for a long term agreement Draft letter from the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and European Union's The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, to the President of Iran.
Framework long-term agreement Framework for a long-term agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany &United Kingdom, with the support of the high representative of the European Union.
NPT Briefing Book, 2014 edition Published by King's College London, UK, for its Centre for Science and Security Studies, in association with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), US.
Taking down nuclear weapons in a virtual world Story on an avatar-based virtual reality (ABVR) experiment undertaken by the Monterey Institute of International Studies to demonstrate the steps to achieving the “inevitable that one day the nuclear weapon possessing states will disarm.”